The First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) has dismissed an appeal against the Information Commissioner's finding that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office did not hold a copy of a 1955 certificate awarded on behalf of Queen Elizabeth II to a member of the Haud Constabulary in colonial-era Somaliland, concluding on the balance of probabilities that no in-scope information was held even though the department might once - and perhaps should - have held it.
in Abdulrizak Abdi Yusuf v The Information Commissioner [2026] UKFTT 984 (GRC), the tribunal decided the appeal on the papers in a decision given on 2 July 2026, found that the FCDO's searches were sensible and reasonably directed to locating the requested information, and that the appellant's arguments about the historical and personal significance of the records, however understandable, did not bear on the statutory question of whether the information was held at the time of the request.
Abdulrizak Abdi Yusuf holds a copy of a certificate dated June 1955, signed by the Governor of what was then British Somaliland, recording an award made to his father in recognition of loyal service to the Crown in the Haud Constabulary. The original certificate and an accompanying medal were lost during the civil war.
After the Royal Archives suggested that copies of such documents may have been forwarded to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Yusuf asked the FCDO in February 2025 for a copy of the certificate or any related documentation. The FCDO responded that it held no information within the scope of the request and maintained that position on internal review, and the Commissioner's decision notice of 17 November 2025 concluded that on the balance of probabilities no in-scope information was held.
Section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 entitles a requester to be informed whether a public authority holds requested information and, if so, to have it communicated. Where the dispute is whether information is held at all, the established approach in cases including Preston v Information Commissioner, Bromley v Information Commissioner and the Environment Agency and Oates v Information Commissioner requires the tribunal to decide the question on the balance of probabilities, considering the scope, thoroughness and results of the authority's searches together with any other relevant evidence, including whether there is a motive to conceal.
The tribunal reviewed the searches undertaken by the FCDO, which included consulting the Honours Secretariat, seeking input from departmental historians who provided potential search references for records at The National Archives, conducting digital searches of TNA's catalogue, searching the FCDO Archive Inventory, and checking physical name indexes covering files from 1950 to 1995. The search terms combined the father's names with terms including Somaliland, Haud, constabulary and honours-related vocabulary. The tribunal found the searches reasonable, and saw no evidence of any reluctance to search properly or of any motive to withhold the information.
Yusuf argued that the records must once have existed, relying among other things on the FCO 141 series of so-called migrated archives from former colonial administrations, the transfer in 2025 of more than 307,000 digitised colonial-era records to Kenya, and the historical practice of colonial governors submitting annual honours lists to London. The tribunal accepted that the FCDO might at some point have held information within the scope of the request, and went as far as to acknowledge that perhaps it should have done, but concluded that on the balance of probabilities it did not hold the information when the request was received, which is the only question section 1 poses.
The tribunal also rejected grounds seeking outcomes beyond its jurisdiction under section 58, including requests that it direct further searches, provide guidance on obtaining a replacement certificate, or assist in identifying ephemeral records relating to the award. It found that the FCDO had complied with its duty under section 16 to provide advice and assistance at least to the extent that could reasonably be expected, having sought clarification of the request and suggested other avenues the family might pursue.
The appeal was dismissed.
